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AARON EZEKIEL*

The Application of International
Criminal Law to Resource Exploitation:
Ituri, Democratic Republic of the
Congo
ABSTRACT
Control of natural resources has been a powerful motivator for
internal and international armed conflict in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) for more than a century. In June 2000,
the U.N. Security Council established a Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, which especially
focused on conflict in Ituri Provinceand elsewhere in northeastern
DRC since 1998. During2003 and 2004, the atrocitiescommitted
in this conflict became the focus of the firstformal investigation by
the Office of the Prosecutorof the International Criminal Court
(ICC). This article,following the work of the U.N. Paneland nongovernmental organizations, argues that investigation and
prosecution of the natural resource crimes is both possible under the
ICC Statute and should be at the center of the prosecution as it is
central to the ongoing conflict.
INTRODUCTION
Control of natural resources has been a powerful motivator for
internal and international armed conflict in the Great Lakes region of Africa,
centering on the northeast of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Arguably, all conflicts are driven by competition for control of natural
resources, generally land and especially arable land. However, large scale
misappropriation of resources as a driving force for continuing conflicts
cannot be trivialized. The response to trade in" [clonflict diamonds, ...rough
diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance armed
conflict" is the best known and most comprehensive instance of international attention to and action regarding natural resources crimes.' The

* Aaron B. Ezekiel earned a B.A. in the Political Economy of Education and
Educational Administration from Union Institute and University in 1977 and a J.D. from the
University of New Mexico School of Law in 2006. He served as an editor of the Natural
Resources Journal and is now an associate with Popejoy and MacKenzie PC. He can be
reached at aarone@popejoylaw.com.
1. Kimberly Process, The Kimberly Process, http://kimberleyprocess.com/site/ (last
visited Apr. 19, 2007).
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Kimberley Process certification scheme is the organized response of the
world community to these conflicts.2
Congo's mineral wealth includes copper, cobalt, gold, diamonds,
tantalum, tin, niobium, silver, zinc, uranium, and thorium. 3 This mineral
wealth is Congo's greatest asset and is heavily concentrated in the northeast
of the country, including North and South Kivu provinces and Orientale
province, which includes the Ituri district.4 While the Kimberley Process has
application to the ongoing conflict in eastern DRC, its application to just one
natural resource (diamonds) suggests the inadequacy of the response.
This article argues that such efforts to reduce natural resources
crimes are inadequate in both scope and substance. One alternative that will
be examined is the promulgation of guidelines, conventions, and similar
documents for multinational enterprises operating in areas of conflict and
"weak governance."',6 A related traditional course of action, multi-national

2. Id. (follow "List of Participants" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
3. GEORGES NZONGALA-NTALAJA, THE CONGO FROM LEOPOLD TO KABILA: A PEOPLE'S
HISTORY 28 (2002).
4. Id. at 27-28. Regarding mineral wealth in Eastern DRC, see, for example, Panel of
Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Addendum to Report, 17 (discussing coltan wealth in"the
eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo"), 26 (discussing gold deposits "in
the north-east and eastern regions, in the Kivus and Maniema and Ituri Provinces"), delivered
to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1072 (letter from Sec'y Gen. dated Nov. 13, 2001),
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/congo/2001/1110letter.pdf (last
visited May 29,2007); Human Rights Watch, UPC Crimes in Ituri (2002-2003), 2 ("Ituri is one
of the richest areas in the Congo with deposits of gold, diamonds, oil and timber"),
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11/08/congo14517.htm (last visited May 29,2007). See
App., 1 & 2, infra (maps of Democratic Republic of Congo and Ituri Province).
5. The Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are a voluntary set of guidelines agreed
upon by the member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). The most recent version was released on September 11, 2000. COMM. ON INT'L INV. &
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, OECD, THE OECD GUIDELNES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
(2000) [hereinafter MNEGUIDELNES], http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf. The
Anti-Bribery Convention, adopted in 1997, entered into force in 1999. Its members agree to
outlaw bribery of foreign officials. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17,1997, entered into force Feb. 15,1999, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/18/
0,2340,en_2649_34859_35029714 1 1 11,00.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2007). See alsoU.S. Dep't
of Commerce, Int'l Trade Admin., Trade Compliance Ctr., OECD Antibribery Report 2001
(describing ratification process and effective date); OECD, Steps taken by the United States to
implement and enforce the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, http://www. oecd.org/document/28/0,2340,en_ 2649-34859
36430556 l1ll,00.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2007).
6. [W]eak governance zones represent some of the world's most difficult
investment environments. In addition to the usual financial and business
risks encountered in all investment environments, weak governance zones
present risks for business that stem directly from government failure - e.g.
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peacekeeping, is also examined briefly. A third alternative is proposed:
assertion of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court under its
existing statute over persons involved in all phases of natural resource
crimes.
NATURAL RESOURCES CRIMES AND THEIR RELATION TO
OTHER INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN DRC
Beginning in June 2000, the U.N. Security Council established a
"Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo." The Panel
delivered six reports and interim updates to the U.N. Security Council from
2001 to 2003 documenting the role various rebel groups, proxy groups,
armies, and governments of surrounding countries and their officers and
officials play in the exploitation of DRC natural resources. Crimes
documented by the Panel and various international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) include forced labor, kidnapping, mass rape and
sexual slavery, mutilation, and mass murder (possibly meeting the
definition of genocide in some ethnically based instances). The Panel's
reports emphasize that these crimes are both in aid of and financed by the
profits from illegal appropriation of natural resources in the Ituri forest and
elsewhere in eastern DRC.7
Illegal resource extraction also has dramatic negative effects on
animal species native to the region.

widespread solicitation, extortion, endemic crime and violence, abuses by
security forces, and violations of the rule of law.
OECD, OECD RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR INVESTORS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES 3 (Draft
Text for Public Consultation, deadline for comments, Nov. 23, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/54/42/35562068.pdf.
7. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Final Report,
124-29, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (letter from Sec'y Gen. dated Oct. 15, 2002)
[hereinafter Panel Report Five] (fifth in a series of reports describing armed conflict and its
consequences in the Uganda-controlled area). [Editor's note: this report is designated by the
Panel as its "Final Report," but the Secretary General also identifies the Panel's subsequent
2003 report as a "final report." See infra note 25.] See alsoHuman Rights Watch, Ituri:"Covered
in Blood" Ethnically TargetedViolence in NortheasternDR Congo, 15 HUMAN RiGHTS WATCH, No.
11, July 2003, at 19-47 [hereinafter Ituri:Covered in Blood], hrw.org/reports/2003/ituriO7O3/
DRC0703full.pdf; Human Rights Watch, Seeking Justice: The ProsecutionofSexual Violence in the
Congo War, 17 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No. 1A,Mar. 2005, at 7-21, http://hrw.org/reports/
2005/drc0305/drc0305.pdf; CrIzENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, IN UNCHARTED WATERS: SEEKING
JUSTiCE BEFORE THE ATROCMES HAVE STOPPED -THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN
UGANDA AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (2004) [hereinafter UNCHARTED
WATERS], http://www.globalsolutions.org/files/general/press/pdfs/uncharted-waters.pdf.
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[In].. .national parks and reserves in the northeastern section
of the DRC, the numbers of lowland gorillas, okapis, and
elephants have significantly dropped as miners kill the
animals, eat the meat, and sell the ivory tusks of elephants.
The gorillas are very rare and may be on the brink of
extinction. Approximately 140 eastern lowland gorillas
remain in Kahuzi-Biega Park, down from 280 in 1996. 4000
out of 12,000 elephants were killed between 1995 and 1999 in
a northeastern national park, while only 2 out of 350 elephant
families remain in the coltan-rich Kahuzi-Biega Park. As the
conditions surrounding their countrymen worsens (sic) due
to the conflict they take part in, rebel groups and miners
continue8 to degrade the very land they must depend on to
survive.
The Panel's research coincided with the development of the
Kimberley Process, an international effort to halt the entry of conflict
diamonds into world markets. 9 A similar effort to control the trade in
"conflict timber" has also been proposed and is arguably easier to
implement, given the relative difficulty of hiding logs as compared to
diamonds."
DRC was a transit point for Angolan conflict diamonds, which
financed the UNITA (The National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola) rebel movement until UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's death in 2002.
The Panel's reports document that DRC has since become a source of
conflict diamonds, with at least some diamonds transiting through
Uganda.' Congolese timber from the eastern portion of the country
traditionally was floated down the Congo River for export via Kinshasa. 2
Tanzania and Uganda now receive shipments of Congolese timber and ship
it overseas via the ports of Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania and Mombasa, Kenya. 3
The Panel Reports extensively documented multiple corrupt
international networks for misappropriation of Congo's natural resources.
In the government-controlled area of DRC, Zimbabwe Defence Industries,

8. Natalie D. Ware, CongoWar and the Role of Coltan,at pt II, § 6 (case study prepared for
Inventory of Conflict & Env't), available at http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/congocoltan.htm (last visited May 29, 2007).
9. Rudy S. Salo, Note, When the Logs Roll Over: The Need for an InternationalConvention
CriminalizingInvolvement in the Global Illegal Timber Trade, 16 GEO. INT'L ENvrL. L. REv. 127,
137-39 (2003).
10. Id. at 139-46.
11. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms
36-47, delivered
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Addendum to Report,
to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1072 (letter from Sec'y Gen., dated Nov. 13, 2001).

12. Id. 1 48.
13.

Id.
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an arm of the Zimbabwean armed forces, has been deeply involved." The
network's goal has been "to maintain [the Congolese-Zimbabwean elite
network's] grip on the main mineral resources - diamonds, cobalt, copper,
germanium- of the Government-controlled area."15 The value of mineral
assets transferred from DRC state enterprises to the network's private
companies has totaled at least U.S. $5 billion over three years according to
Panel Report Five. 6
In Ituri and elsewhere in northeastern DRC, elite networks
associated with the Uganda Patriotic Defense Force (UPDF) and its generals
and the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) have played major roles in DRC
resource misappropriation.17 Each group operates within an area of
influence inside DRC controlled by its military and allied informal forces."
Investment, transport, and logistical services are provided by international
natural resource businesses, which are also recipients of the illicit
production. 9 Local ethnic militias, numerous rebel groups, and village selfdefense forces are part of a shifting, rapidly realigning group of armed
forces that sometimes are supported by and sometimes oppose the foreign
armies and the DRC's armed forces.2'
RWANDA-CONTROLLED AREA
In the Rwanda-controlled area, the RPA carries on gold and coltan2'
mining activities centrally managed by the RPA's Congo Desk.' The Panel
of Experts estimate that 60 to 70 percent of coltan mining in eastern DRC
occurs through a variety of "forced labour regimes" under the direct
surveillance of "RPA mining detaches."' The coltan is then flown by RPA
and its collaborators directly to Rwanda without payment of taxes to any
DRC entity. 24

14. Panel Report Five, supra note 7, 77 22-58; Norman Mlambo, The Zimbabwe Defence
Industry, 1980-1995, SACDI DEFENCE DIG. sec. 5 (Working Paper No. 2, n.d.), http://ccrweb.
ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest02.html (last visited May 29, 2007).
15. Supra note 7, 22.
16. Id.
17. Id. IT 69-70, 97-98.
18. Id. 77 65-96 (addressing the Rwandan elite network's activities and effect); id. 7
97-131 (addressing the Ugandan elite network's activities and effect).
19. See id. IT 43-46, 79-81, 109-11.
20. See Ituri: Covered in Blood, supranote 7, at 15-16 & chart, "Web of Alliances in Ituri"
(reproduced infra as Appendix, No. 3).
21. "Coltan, short for Columbite-tantalite, is essential for the power-storing parts of cell
phones, nuclear reactors, PlayStations, and computer chips." Ware, supra note 8, pt. I, § 2.
22. Panel Report Five, supra note 7, 70.
23. Id. 75.
24. Id.
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In tracing one commercial chain of coltan mining, transport,
refining, and sale, the Panel identified two interrelated Ohio-based
companies with offices in DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi; a Kazakhhstan
coltan refiner; a Chinese coltan processor; a Mozambican shipper; a South
African trading company; a Dutch coltan purchaser; and a German
company, a subsidiary of Bayer AG, which is a buyer of processed
tantalum. 25
The extent of natural resource misappropriation is huge in relation
to military budgets, national budgets, and gross domestic product.
Calculations by the Panel for 1999 indicated that RPA Congo Desk revenues
were about four times the U.S. $80 million allocated to the RPA in the
Rwandan national budget.26 This figure, U.S. $320 million, is 20 percent of
Rwanda's 1999 GDP and about 150 percent of the Rwandan annual budget
for that year.27 Thus, theft of DRC natural resources is quadrupling the
funds available to the RPA to continue the conflict in eastern DRC.

25. United States: Trinitech International, Inc., Eagle Wings Resources International;
Kazakhstan: NAC Kazatomprom; China: Ningxia Non-Ferrous Metals Smeltery;
Mozambique: Mozambique Gemstone Company; South Africa: AMC African Trading and
Consulting Company Ltd.; Netherlands: Chemie Pharmacie Holland; and Germany: H.C.
Starck. Id. 79-80.
It should be noted that the U.S., German and Chinese companies were listed
in the Panel's final report as having resolved the allegations against them.
However, several reports at the time the October 2003 final report was
released questioned its veracity and completeness. The Independentreported
that "[a] controversial section has been omitted from a UN report on the
plunder of wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo.... [Tihe section
includes details on how shady networks of business and military figures,
some tied to the governments of Rwanda and Uganda, are continuing
illegally to export gold, diamonds and other minerals from eastern Congo.
Declan Walsh, UN Cuts Details of Western Profiteersfrom Congo Report, INDEPENDENT
(London), Oct. 27, 2003, available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/
article93191.ece. Friends of the Earth (FOE) points out that the Panel's final report does not
provide any information explaining how allegations were resolved. Press Release, Friends of
the Earth 5 (Oct. 27, 2003), http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/unreportnemo.pdf. This is a
significant unresolved issue since 42 of 85 Annex III-listed companies received a "No Further
Action Required" listing in the Panel's 2003 final report. Id. at 3. FOE also notes that Cabot
Corporation, another U.S. Annex III-listed company and the world's largest refiner of coltan,
was headed by Samuel Bodman from 1992 until July 2001, when he became a Bush
administration appointee as Deputy Secretary of Commerce and Treasury. Id. at 4. He became
Secretary of Energy in February 2005. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Samuel W. Bodman,
http://www.energy.gov/organization/samueLbodman.htm (last visited Apr.19, 2007). See
also Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report [as designated by the Sec'y Gen.],
Annex I, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1027 (letter from Sec'y Gen. dated
Oct. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Panel Report Six].
26. Panel Report Five, supra note 7, 71.
27. Id.
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UGANDA-CONTROLLED AREA
According to the Panel, the elite network in the Uganda-controlled
area is far less centralized than that in the Rwanda-controlled area. Its
purpose, however, is similar: "monopolistic control over the area's principal
natural resources, cross-border trade, and tax revenues for the purpose of
enriching" the participants.2 The Uganda network is made up of highranking Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) officers, private
businessmen, and rebel leaders. 29 Front companies controlled by members
of the network are given tax exemptions that are denied to their
competitors. 0 Alongside military intimidation, manipulation of the banking
sector, and the quasi-legitimate public faqade provided by the rebel
movements, these tax exemptions have made it easy for UPDF elite network
companies to dominate the local economy.31 Coltan, gold, diamonds, and
timber are the natural resource exports from which the elite network
derives its revenues, along with control over import of consumables, theft,
and tax fraud. 32
In the Uganda-controlled area, competition for illegitimate control
of natural resources is at the heart of much conflict portrayed as essentially
ethnic in character. A conflict reported by the Panel between Hema and
Lendu groups in Ituri encapsulates this issue. In February 2002, the UPDF
engaged in a series of attacks on the village of Geti. Panel sources reported
that Hema businessmen had financed the UPDF attacks because they
"sought.. .control over gold deposits in the Geti area, and that in fact the
ethnic conflict was a minor issue."33
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT'S COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
(OECD/CIME) RESPONSE
Panel Report Five includes three annexes recommending financial
restrictions on 29 companies named in Annex I, financial restrictions and
travel bans on 54 individuals named in Annex II, and the listing of 85
businesses considered to be in violation of the MNE Guidelines of the

28.

Id.

97.

29.

Id.

98.

30.
31.
32.
33.

See id.
98, 104-05.
Id.
100-01, 104-05.
Id.
100-01.
Id. 123.
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OECD in Annex III.34 The companies listed in annexes I and III are located
across the world, including DRC and neighboring African states, South
Africa, European Union states, Thailand, Finland, China, Kazakhstan, and
the United States. The Panel met with companies and individuals who
objected to being named in the Panel's report and annexes or to the
characterization of their activities. The Panel ultimately issued an additional
report listing the results of those meetings.3" At the end of its Security
Council mandate, the Panel referred unresolved cases to the "National
Contact Points" (NCPs) identified in the Multi-national
Enterprises (MNE)
36
Guidelines and to other national authorities.
It is generous to state that OECD's Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises (known as the Investment
Committee or CIME) did not respond with enthusiasm to the Panel's
reliance on the MNE Guidelines. The Panel's view of the MNE Guidelines as
a standard of corporate behavior and its commitment to protecting the
safety of its sources were both known to the OECD.37 However, in a public
statement issued on February 12, 2004, the Investment Committee
complained that the Panel contacted just three of ten NCPs (who had
companies listed in Annex III headquartered in their country).' The Panel's
reports note repeatedly that the U.N. Panel itself is not a judicial body with
enforcement powers and thus is not able to protect witnesses who come

34. Id. Annexes I-Ill. See also MNE GUIDELINES, supra note 5 (The MNE Guidelines were
used by the Panel as a measure of appropriate international business behavior.).
35. The Panel's standard of proof, a significant issue for future use of Panel reports by
the International Criminal Court or other judicial bodies, is described as "reasonableness" or
"sufficient cause." The Panel report states that it restricted itself to "identifying parties where
it[s]... information indicat[ed that] a prima facie case [required an] answer." Panel Report Six,
supra note 25, 1 15-16, Annex I. See also supranote 25 (discussing the lack of information in
Panel Report Six about the means by which allegations against nearly half the companies
listed were resolved).
36. Panel Report Six, supra note 25, 77 20-21.
37. The MNE Guidelines have been adopted by OECD member states and several other
states. See MNE GUIDELINES, supranote 5. As the guidelines are voluntary, it seems reasonable
to believe that the OECD would applaud their adoption as a measure by other institutions.
Id. The MNE Guidelines "are an essential component of the 1976 Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises." OECD, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 1 (OCDE/GD(97)40 1997). The Panel's account of its contacts
with CIME confirms that supposition and states that a process was agreed upon for referring
information to CIME NCPs about companies incorporated in their jurisdiction, "subject to
protecting the security of the [Panel's] sources." Panel Report Six, supra note 25,
20-21
(emphasis added).
38. OECD Comm. on Int'l Inv. & Multinational Enterprises, Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Public Statement by CIME (Feb. 12,
2004) [hereinafter OECD CIME, Illegal Exploitation], http://www.oecd.org/document/
6/0,2340,en.2649_34889_27217798_1_1l,00.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2007).
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forward voluntarily from reprisals.39 The OECD statement noted that the
chair of the Investment Committee wrote a letter that the OECD SecretaryGeneral transmitted to the U.N. Secretary-General suggesting ways "that
future cooperation might be enhanced."'
The statement also reported that the Investment Committee
planned to start a project to use the DRC as a case study to help it
understand how "companies, NCPs and other actors [can].. .conduct
business responsibly in the DRC and other 'weak governance zones.'"'41 The
OECD released the description of that project in May 2004 and included a
timeline with draft and final reports scheduled to be available in December
2004 and spring 2005, respectively. 42 Fourteen responses to the draft report
are available.43 As of this writing, neither the draft nor the final report is
available on OECD's website. 44
Thus, by early 2006, the OECD, the body most concerned with
breaches of its own standards of behavior for multinational business, was
still studying the problem of "companies [that] appear to have benefited
from the chaotic environment in the [DRC] through, for example, the
acquisition of concessions or other contracts.. .on terms that were more
favorable than they might have received in countries where there was peace
and stability." 4 The United States' NCP, Wesley Scholz, director of the
Office of Investment Affairs in the State Department, was reported in

39. The U.N. Office of Legal Affairs provided guidance to the Panel. The Office of Legal
Affairs recommended that information and documents be handed over to responding
individuals and entities "provided that such release did not place at risk the safety of Panel
members, its staff or its sources, did not violate a duty of confidentiality owed to a source or
did not compromise the Panel's internal decision-making." PanelReport Six, supranote 25,
14-16.
40. OECD CIME, Illegal Exploitation, supra note 38.
41. Id.
42. OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: CONDUCTING BUSINESS WITH INTEGRITY IN WEAK GOVERNANCE

ZONES: OECD INSTRUMENTS AND EXAMPLES FROM THE DRC 6 (2004), www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/1/3/33760086.pdf.
43. The responses make clear that a draft report has circulated. See ALL PARTY
PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION AND GENOCIDE PREVENTION (APPG), THE

OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINAT.CNAL ENTERPRISES AND THE DRC: INTERIM FINDINGS (2004),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/57/34304866.pdf.
44. The Investment Committee's listed contact has not responded to an e-mail inquiry
about the status of the project. E-mail from author to the OECD Investment Committee's
official contact address, DAF.Contact@oecd.org (Apr. 26, 2005, 11:15 PM EDT) (on file with
author).
45. Panel Report Six, supranote 25, 12. The report listing apparent violators of the NMNE
Guidelines was released on October 15, 2002, more than three-and-one-half years ago at this
writing. Panel Report Five, supranote 7 (date of letter from Chairman of the Panel to the Sec'y
Gen.).
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October 2003 to have argued "that the OECD Guidelines do not apply to the
U.S. corporations named in the October report because they were not
directly involved in the DRC, but only purchased resources through their
parties. " ' Little or no practical assistance in cutting the ties between natural
resource exploitation, arms trafficking, and political and ethnic violence can
be expected through this process.
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES
As documented by the Panel, natural resource exploitation both
motivates continuing conflict throughout eastern and northeastern DRC,
including Ituri, and serves as the funding source for arms and other military
necessities.47
Panel reports of 2002 and 2003 clearly link resource exploitation to
conflict and arms trafficking. Continued conflict and instability serves as an
excuse for neighboring countries to maintain a military presence or support
internal armed groups, thereby allowing unfettered access to DRC natural
resources. The sale of illegally extracted resources is the critical funding
source for the activities of armed groups.'
With a U.N. mandate, the "Artemis" Force, a French-led, European
Union (EU) Interim Emergency Multinational Force, operated in Bunia, Ituri
Province from June through September 2003."' The EU force went into
Bunia after armed groups burned it on May 6, 2 00 3 .50 Sudden withdrawal
by Ugandan (UPDF) forces in Bunia on that date precipitated a power
struggle for control of the city.'
Security Council resolution 1493, adopted in July 2003, prepared for
the departure of the EU force by authorizing the Ituri Brigade with a
strengthened mandate.5 2 Then U.N. Secretary-General Annan outlined the

46. Jim Lobe, Global Businesses Profitfrom Congo War,Groups Charge,GLOBALPOLICY FORUM,
Oct. 28,2003, http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/2003/1028congo profit.htm.
47. PanelReportSix, supra note 25,
43-47 (discussing, diagramming, and summarizing
the links between resource exploitation, arms trafficking, and continuing conflict).
48. Id. 44.
49. Amnesty Int'l USA, Democratic Republic of Congo-Ituri:A Need for Protection,a Thirst
for Justice, http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/dr-congo/document.do?id=71711FE4
D330C1C880256DDA00478B0C (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. S.C. Res. 1493, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (July 28,2003). The resolution
[ajuthorizes MONUC to use all necessary means to fulfill its mandate in the
Ituri district and, as it deems it within its capabilities, in North and South
Kivu; Requests the Secretary-General to deploy in the Ituri district, as soon
as possible, the tactical brigade-size force whose concept of operation is set
out in paragraphs 48 to 54 of his second special report, including the
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violence occurring in Ituri, especially between the Hema and Lendu ethnic
groups, from February through May 2003.53 He also described the negotiation of a ceasefire agreement that led to the creation of the Ituri Pacification
Commission and the deployment of a 700 to 800 member MONUC reserve
unit to Bunia. s Annan recommended creation of a MONUC brigade to
operate in Bunia beginning in August 2003.55 By mid-November, the 4,800strong Ituri Brigade fully deployed in Bunia and began to expand outside
the town.56 Yet even these numerically greater and more forceful troops
were only able, at best, to stabilize the level of violence. 7
Both U.N. and OECD approaches are lacking a crucial element, the
ability to hold parties personally accountable. Criticism of "impunity" is a
thread in much of the dialogue about Congo's war and the violence in
Ituri. However, the rule of law is not functioning in Ituri. Ituri's intractable
conflict presents a problem that the International Criminal Court is precisely
intended to address, the inability of a state to carry out an investigation and
prosecution; literally to maintain the rule of law. 9

reinforced MONUC presence in Bunia by mid-August 2003 as requested in
resolution 1484 (2003), particularly with a view to helping to stabilize the
security conditions and improving the humanitarian situation, ensuring the
protection of airfields and displaced persons living in camps and, if the
circumstances warrant it, helping to ensure the security of the civilian
population and the personnel of the United Nations and the humanitarian
organizations in Bunia and its environs and eventually, as the situation
permits, in other parts of Ituri....
Id. T 26, 27. Resolution 1493 specifically authorizes the use of force to carry out MONUC's
mission, including that of the Ituri Brigade, by stating that it is "[a]cting under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations...." Id. at 2. See U.N. CHARTER art. 42 (authority to use
armed force). MONUC is the French acronym for United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. See generally MONUC, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
missions/monuc/index.htn (for more background information about MONUC) (last visited
Mar. 18, 2007).
53. The Secretary-General, Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
9-17, U.N. Doc.
S/2003/566/ (May 27, 2003) [hereinafter Second Special Report].
54. Id. For MONUC, see supra note 52.
55. Second Special Report, supra note 53, 7 48-54.
56. The Secretary-General, Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-Generalon the United Nations
OrganizationMission in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, 7 7-9, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1098
(Nov. 17, 2003).
57. Id.
58. See PanelReport Six, supranote 25, diagram following 46; Second Special Report, supra
note 53,
46, 62, 71. See also UNCHARTED WATERS, supra note 7, passim.
59. International Criminal Court, Rome Statute, arts. 14, 17, A/CONF.183/9 (July 17,
1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute], availableat http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.
htm (DRC is unable to prosecute, as required for admissibility under art. 17(1)(a); DRC has
made a referral of the Ituri situation as required for admissibility under art. 14.). Prosecutor
Receives Referral of the Situation in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo, ICC-OTP-20040419-50-En,
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE EASTERN
DRC/ITURI CONFLICT
Even setting aside the Rome Statute,the crimes reported in Ituri are
clearly of a serious, widespread, and systematic enough nature to qualify
as crimes of universal jurisdiction under customary international law.'
However, universal jurisdiction is, in this instance, of little or no value since
all the states in the region are implicated in the crimes and few of the
perpetrators in the region seem likely to leave. Perhaps "universal
criminality" will be the term coined to explain this episode when viewed
from a sober distance.
With no prospect of prosecution by the DRC national legal system
in sight, President Joseph Kabila referred "the situation of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed anywhere in the territory of
the DRC since the entry into force of the Rome Statute, on 1 July 2002" to
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo.61
In the same press release, Prosecutor Ocampo announced that he was
continuing to analyze the DRC situation, "especially in Ituri." s2 Nearly a
year later, the prosecutor sought and received permission from ICC PreTrial Chamber I to "request the services of the Netherlands Forensic
Institute" in examining unspecified evidence. 63 This step made clear that
there will be prosecutions arising from the "traditional" war crimes and

Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=19&l=en.htnl (last visited May 29, 2007). The Office of the Prosecutor of the
InternationalCriminalCourt OpensIts FirstInvestigation, ICC-OTP-20040623-59-En, Office of the
Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease-details&id=
26&l=en.html (last visited May 29, 2007).
60. Customary international law is "[i]nternational law that derives from the practice of
states and is accepted by them as legally binding." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
While this definition is a potentially confusing oversimplification, it is nevertheless accurate
to state that the violent crimes discussed above are widely accepted as crimes of universal
jurisdiction since Nuremberg. The trials held by the U.N.-constituted international criminal
tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and former Yugoslavia (ICTY) demonstrate that these crimes
continue to be in current usage by the world community. "[T]he universality principle allows
any state jurisdiction under international law to provide criminal... [sanctions] for violations
of international law." JORDAN J. PAusT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 157 (2d. ed. 2000).
61. Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (Apr.19, 2004), availableat http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease-details&id
=19.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
62. Id.
63. Press Release, ICC, Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on the Prosecutor's Request
under Article 56 of the Rome Statute (Apr. 26, 2005), available at http://www.icccpi.int/press/pressreleases/105.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
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crimes against humanity in the Ituri district. Confirmation came nearly a
year later with the first arrest in the DRC investigation. 64
However, another significant question arises. What about the illegal
appropriation of natural resources that is well documented as the motivator
and funding source for these crimes?6 Will the ICC Prosecutor seek charges
for the natural resources crimes? If so, who will be the defendants? What
will be the charges?
THE ROME STATUTE AND ELEMENTS OF CRIMES
There was little, if any, discussion of natural resources crimes in the
"pre-history" of the Rome Statute, the 50 years after Nuremberg from 1948
until adoption of the statute in 1998. International Law Commission (ILC)
reports do not mention environmental or natural resource crimes until
1995. 66 In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago raised issues of effective means of
combating international drug trafficking. The General Assembly responded
in 1990, once again encouraging the ILC to examine this matter as part of its
project (ongoing since 1947) of drafting a Code of Crimes Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind. This bit of good fortune reopened discussions that
led to the Rome Statute. 67 (Drug trafficking was ultimately not included in
the adopted Rome Statute.')
Although there was brief discussion of "willful and severe damage
to the environment" as a crime (illegal appropriation of natural resources
was not mentioned), the proposed crime was not included in the ILC draft
statute. The argument against its inclusion is that "in most cases such
damage will be caught by other crimes, such as aggression or war crimes,

64. In January 2006, the ICC Prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant against Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, the founder and head of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) and its
military wing, Forces Patriotiques Pour la Lib&ation du Congo (FPLC). Lubanga Dyilo is
charged with the war crime of enlisting and conscripting children under 15 and using them
to participate in hostilities. The warrant was unsealed in March 2006, after Lubanga Dyilo was
taken into ICC custody and flown out of DRC. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Int'l
Criminal Court, Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-OTP20060302-126-En (Mar. 17, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/
133.html.
65. See supra notes 7-33 and accompanying text.
66. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Seventh Session, U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 62-63, U.N. Doc. No. A/50/10(SUPP) (1995); THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 2-3 (Roy
S. Lee ed., 1999).
67. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 66.
68. Id. at 86-87.
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and where that is not the case, there may be doubt as to whether it achieves
the threshold of gravity for an international crime."69
So, what are the crimes and elements of crimes that subsume gross
violations of environmental welfare and misappropriation of national stores
of natural resources? Do they potentially apply to the core natural resource
exploitation activities in Ituri and elsewhere in Congo? All the potential
candidates are grouped under Article 8 of the Rome Statute, War Crimes.
The elements are duplicative to account for both international warfare and
"armed conflict not of an international character." 70
Subsections that are candidates for application to Ituri and DRC
generally are:
" Art. 8(2)(a)(iv): War crime of destruction and appropriation of
property;
* Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii): War crime of destroying or seizing the
enemy's property;
• Art. 8(2)(b)(xvi): War crime of pillaging;
• Art. 8(2)(e)(v) War crime of pillaging; and
* Art. 8(2)(e)(xii) War crime of destroying or seizing the enemy's
property.'
Article 8(2)(a)(iv) provides protection for property of civilians,
which seems to include personal ownership of natural resources rights. It
applies in the situation of an international conflict and requires that the
property be protected by one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 72 It
also requires that the appropriation be extensive and wanton. Protection
applies to real property as well as personal property. 7' The Fourth Geneva
Convention also prohibits destruction of state and property owned
collectively; thus, it applies to the property of legal persons (corporations
and other business entities) that hold natural resources property. 74
Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) provides stronger protections to natural
resources property in international conflicts. Only in cases of military
necessity is seizure of property allowed. Property is protected from

69. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 522-23
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
70. ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(c)(i)-1, Official Records,
ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 3-10, 2002) [hereinafter ICC, Elements of Crimes], available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/asprecords/ASP_ stsession.html.
71. Id. at 127, 137-38, 150, 155.
72. Most relevant to this issue is the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Aug. 12, 1949), http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/
b/92.htm (Civilians are the vast majority of those affected by the ongoing violence and
economic exploitation in the Ituri/eastern DRC war zone.).
73. Id. art. 53 (addressing "destruction," which can reasonably include destruction of
wealth or livelihood by appropriation and other forms of taking).
74. Id.
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destruction or seizure under the international law of armed conflict. This
more general term allows for the potential consideration of customary
international law and any other generally accepted laws of war. It may also
open the door for far narrower interpretations of "the international law of
armed conflict. " 'T
Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) outlaws pillaging in international conflicts. It is
clearly the strongest protection of those discussed so far. The elements are
clear and simple. The property was "appropriated."76 The intent was "to
deprive the owner of the property and appropriate it for private or personal
use. The appropriation was without the consent of the owner."' 7
Article 8(2)(e)(v) outlaws pillaging in a conflict "not of an
international character." The elements are precisely the same as its
counterpart in international conflicts. 78
Article 8(2)(e)(xii) duplicates article 8(2)(b)(xiii) in the context of "a
conflict not of an international character." Although it is intended for
internal conflicts, it includes the same reference to the international law of
armed conflict as its counterpart, raising the same possibilities and
problems noted above.79
The war crime of pillaging is squarely on target, encompassing all
the methods of illegal appropriation recounted by NGOs and the Panel. Yet,
at first blush, pillaging sounds like an ancillary crime, perhaps a minor,
"throw-away" charge when compared to the laundry list of human
brutality already recounted. Yet it should be at the center, not the periphery,
of prosecutions arising from the situation in Ituri.
The Panel's reports demonstrated repeatedly and convincingly that
natural resource exploitation has been both the motivation and the funding
source for continuing warfare. Many other crimes likely to be prosecuted,
including forced labor and hostage taking, are incidental to illegal resource
extraction, which is pillaging. Because the elements of the crime are so
simple, it is likely to be easier to prove than some other crimes. Theft of
natural resources and the wealth it creates tend to leave a forensic trail of
bills of lading, shipping orders, wire transfers, contracts, etc.
Ease of proof may also allow the ICC Prosecutor the luxury of
following confessions and convictions up the ladder to reach the actors
involved at the highest levels in organizing these crimes. Cooperation of
international partners in illegal activities may stand up as a charge of
pillaging. It will be extremely difficult to conclusively connect foreign

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 70,at 137.
Id. at 138-39.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 155.
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financiers to organized forced labor or other brutal crimes unless proof is
available that they knowingly cooperated in stealing the natural resources
in question.
Like Belgium's Leopold II, Congo's first proprietor, international
natural resources companies and executives are likely to walk away
unscathed and wealthier regardless of their level of complicity. The only
indictment and arrest to date is of one rebel leader, Mr. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, 80 for the war crime of enlisting and conscripting children under 15
years of age. The contrast between this single arrest and the extensive
information on vicious economic exploitation developed by the United
Nations Security Council's Panel over several years, as recounted above,81
suggests that international business executives may escape the prosecutor's
grasp.
A credible threat of personal criminal liability can bring
accountability where the OECD MNE Guidelines produce years of foot
dragging and other NGO and international organizations' actions have no
means to pierce the corporate veil.
Additionally, evidence of economic motivations for other war
crimes may be accessible only in corporate files. Companies tend to have
contracts with their suppliers, no matter how unsavory. An opportunity to
bring executives into court may result in fuller documentation of motives
and more success in the prosecution of other war crimes.
A prosecution that does not seek to punish the greatest beneficiaries
of these crimes will have failed in two critical respects. Appropriation of its
natural resources is inextricably tied to Congo's 120-year history of
brutality.82 This generation of Congo's pillagers must face sure, stiff
consequences if the cycle of theft and death is to end. A recent nationwide
mortality survey, conducted by the International Rescue Committee,

80. Warrant of Arrest, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of
the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, No. ICC-01-04-01/06 (Feb. 10, 2006) (French
original, official English translation by the Court), available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-2_tEnglish.pdf.
81. See supra notes 7-33 and accompanying text.
82. From the beginning of the European colonial period, DRC and its predecessor states
and colonies, Zaire, the Belgian Congo, and the Congo Free State, were organized around a
principle of wealth extraction to benefit the rulers. Acts now clearly defined as crimes against
humanity were business as usual. This background is a factor in the intractability of conflict
in the modem DRC. Congo's European colonial period was especially harsh. As an
independent European state only since 1830, Belgium had no imperial history. King Leopold
II, Belgium's second king, set about the task of assembling an empire to enrich himself and
develop his country. By 1885, the Congo Free State (CFS) became the only colony personally
owned by a monarch. NZONGALA-NTALAJA, supranote 3, at 20-21. See also ADAM HOCHSCHILD,
KING LEOPOLD'S GHosT: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRIcA 33,
36, 80-85 (1998).
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estimates the death toll in DRC at 3.3 million people from 1998 through
2002, lending credence to description of the DRC conflict as Africa's first
world war. 83
Finally, this is the first prosecution at the ICC and may be the first
to go to trial. International natural resource appropriators and arms
traffickers who collaborated with criminal networks should not walk away
free, leaving Congolese and other Central Africans facing criminal liability
for war crimes. Criminal responsibility for war crimes does not stop at the
borders of less-developed countries. This prosecution will shape how the
ICC is viewed and how seriously the OECD MNE Guidelines and similar
appeals are taken in the developed world and multinational boardrooms.
The threat of personal criminal liability and effective prosecution may have
a salutary effect on corporate behavior.

83. Benjamin Coghlan et al., Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Nationwide
Survey, 367 LANcET 44,49 (2006).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Appendix

Map of Democratic Republic of the Congo
Map of Ituri District
Web of Alliances in Ituri, May 2003
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